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Abstract
Traditional cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) of flood risk reductionmeasures usually ignore dis-
tributions of damages over populations, which disadvantages the poor. Instead, a CBA based
on social welfare includes individual social vulnerability through relative impacts on con-
sumption. If vulnerabilities are high, floods are catastrophic and cause poverty, migration
or indirect deaths, and risk reductions have high social welfare values. For non-catastrophic
risks, social welfare values of risks are relatively higher for vulnerable low-income house-
holds. We present a framework to integrate social vulnerability into CBAs, and show how
financial protection reduces social flood vulnerability and provides welfare benefits. A case
study illustrates that traditional CBAs underestimate the social welfare value of flood risk
reduction measures, up to a factor of 30. Data on financial protection is however scarce,
which hampers estimation of the social welfare value in practice. A solution is to increase
financial protection of individuals, in addition to offering physical flood protection.
Keywords: social vulnerability; social resilience; cost-benefit analysis; flood riskmanagement; equity; social
welfare; natural disasters
1. Introduction
Worldwide about 70 million people are exposed to floods, andmore will be in the future
when climate changes and populations grow (UNISDR, 2011). Major investments in
flood risk management (FRM) are needed which, in light of limited financial resources,
often need to be justified on the basis of expected flood risk reduction benefits – an
evaluation procedure called cost-benefit analysis (CBA).
Most of the traditional ‘flood’ CBAs focus narrowly on avoided asset damages, and
do not adequately account for the interests of the poor, who own few assets (e.g., Cutter
et al., 2013; Mechler et al., 2014). Poor people compose a relatively large share of the
population exposed to floods, and are often more vulnerable, especially in developing
countries (e.g., Winsemius et al., 2018). Focusing on avoiding asset damages will steer
© Cambridge University Press 2019
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investments in flood risk reduction to areas with people who are already relatively better
off (e.g., Ward et al., 2017), leaving the poor exposed.
Such CBAs lead to dissatisfaction and questions about the fairness and social justice
of FRMpolicies and programs (e.g., Cutter et al., 2013; Peduzzi, 2017; Doorn et al., 2018;
Sayers et al., 2018). They do not pay much – or any – attention to other types of flood
damages for humans (e.g., income loss and health impacts) which may be substantial
(see, e.g., The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment,
2000). Nor do they consider how flood damage is distributed over people with differ-
ent incomes, and the capacities of those people to cope with, and recover from, floods.
A damage of US$1,000 for one person is thus weighted equally with a damage of US$1
each for a thousand persons, and a damage of US$500 for a person who earns US$1,000
annually is equally weighted with that for a person who earns US$100,000. These CBAs
do not consider ‘social vulnerability’ and ‘socioeconomic resilience’ (Cutter et al., 2013;
Hallegatte et al., 2016) of individuals, communities and societies. They are also at odds
with the ambition of many governments to mainstream policies for disaster risk reduc-
tion (DRR) and climate change adaptation, with social policies aiming at the provision
of safety nets, income distribution and poverty reduction (e.g., Stokkel, 2015). And –
importantly for our paper – those CBAs are inconsistent with social welfare economics,
which is the scientific and ethical foundation of CBAs supporting public investments
decisions, such as those in FRM (e.g., Kind et al., 2017).
In Kind et al. (2017) we discussed how to improve CBAs that focus on DRR. We
reviewed CBA handbooks (e.g., Squire and van der Tak, 1992; Adler and Posner, 2006;
Zerbe and Bellas, 2006; Boardman et al., 2014) and guidelines (e.g., Pearce et al., 2006;
HM Treasury, 2011; European Commission, 2014) and discussed challenges and appli-
cation of CBAs for DRR and FRM (e.g., Hallegatte, 2006; Frontier Economics, 2013;
Kaufman, 2014;Mechler et al., 2014). In particular, we provided the theory and an exam-
ple of how ‘social welfare CBAs’ take social vulnerability and income inequality into
account, by valuing the same amount of financial damage higher for poor and more
vulnerable people, than for non-poor and less vulnerable people. In a hypothetical case
study, we illustrated the importance: it led to different recommendations on what to do
and whom to target, compared to traditional flood CBAs. Implementing social welfare
CBAs in practice, however, requires additional data on, amongst others, how income and
damage is distributed over populations; this data is hard to collect, generate and analyze.
To the best of our knowledge, social welfare CBAs have never been used to evaluate FRM
investments. The closest is the national assessment of socioeconomic flood resiliency
for 90 countries by Hallegatte et al. (2016). In the context of climate mitigation policies,
however, social welfare CBAs are more common (e.g., Tol, 2014).
The objective of this paper is to contribute to improving the understanding and appli-
cation of CBAs for DRR and FRMby showing how social vulnerability and resilience can
be integrated into flood risk assessments andCBAs.We also discuss what additional data
is needed, whether this data is available and hence if this approach is practicable. Finally,
we discuss limitations of the approach and give general suggestions on how to improve
the social welfare of flood-affected people. We do not discuss other possible improve-
ments of traditional CBAs, such as the inclusion of intangibles and indirect effects.
1.1 Types of cost-benefit analyses
Standard economic literature distinguishes between three types of CBAs. Financial CBAs
(FCBAs) take the perspective of project owners and consider only financial revenues and
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costs. This is unsuitable to justify public expenditures on FRM, since most benefits are
not in the form of financial revenues. Applied to decisions of households to invest in
FRM measures, FCBAs compare the costs of measures with the reductions in expected
financial damages. Economic CBAs (ECBAs) consider projects from the perspective of
societies. Costs and benefits are valued in terms of willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-
accept, i.e., how much consumption society is willing to exchange for the inputs and
outputs of the projects. ECBAs focus on individual wellbeing measured by utility and
incorporate indirect and intangible costs and benefits. Social CBAs (SCBAs) are different
fromECBAs sincewellbeing gains and losses for different groups or individuals are given
different weights, as specified by the social welfare function, to derive the aggregate social
welfare value.
In this paper, we use ‘traditional flood CBAs’ to refer to flood CBAs as they are most
commonly practiced (Mechler et al., 2014; Kind et al., 2017). These cannot be classi-
fied as FCBAs, ECBAs or SCBAs: risk reduction benefits are based on expected financial
damage reductions for the entire population, which are not converted into wellbeing
or social welfare losses. We use ‘social welfare CBAs’ to refer to ECBAs. We prefer the
term ‘social welfare CBA’ because it is often misunderstood that, in ECBAs, costs and
benefits should be valued in terms of social welfare, which means that higher values are
assigned to financial flood risk reduction benefits for the poor and vulnerable popula-
tion, without turning this into an (often considered controversial) SCBA, which requires
a second set of weights (see Kind et al., 2017). ‘Traditional flood risk assessments’
refer to flood risk assessments in support of traditional CBAs, while ‘socioeconomic
flood risk assessments’ refer to flood risk assessments in support of social welfare
CBAs.
2. A social welfare economics framework for vulnerability and resilience
Vulnerability and resilience are studied by different disciplines, for different purposes
and at different levels, and hence the literature describes differentmodels and definitions
for these two. For overviews, see Wisner (2013), Zakour and Gillespie (2013) and Rose
(2017). Our model and definitions are rooted in social welfare, which is the focal point
of ECBAs. Social welfare is based on the wellbeing of all individuals in society. Integrat-
ing vulnerability and resilience into social welfare CBAs therefore requires first that the
impact of floods on the wellbeing of all individuals be considered, after which it can be
aggregated. Figure 1 presents our framework for socioeconomic flood risk assessments,
which encompasses the traditional flood risk assessment framework.
Traditional flood risk assessments (left part of figure 1) focus on total flood risk for
an area. Physical vulnerability – the damage caused by floods – is a function of exposure
(e.g., the assets in an area), susceptibility (e.g., the damageability of assets due to contact
with water), and coping strategies to reduce or mitigate damage (e.g., moving furniture
upstairs). In combination with flood probabilities, flood risk – expressed as expected
annual damage (EAD) – is calculated.
Socioeconomic flood risk assessments (right part of figure 1) also consider the impacts
of floods on the wellbeing of individuals. In the context of natural disasters, we assume
that wellbeing is only derived from consumption: the relationship is called a utility func-
tion. Utility functions are concave, indicating that the additional wellbeing derived from
an additional US$ of consumption is higher when consumption is low, and lower when
consumption is high – this is the diminishing marginal utility of consumption. Figure 2
shows an example.
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework for socioeconomic flood risk assessments, inspired by Hallegatte et al. (2016). Dashed lines indicate elementswhich are not quantified in this paper.
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Figure 2. A utility function describing the relation between consumption and wellbeing.
A common mathematical expression for the utility function is:
U(C) = (C(1−γ )/(1 − γ ), for γ ≥ 0, γ = 1,
whereU is utility,C consumption and γ the elasticity ofmarginal utility of consumption.
Floods lead to a reduction in an individual’s consumption, e.g., because income is
diverted from consumption to replacement of damaged goods, or because income is lost.
We assume that in the absence of financial protection, flood damages lead to immedi-
ate reductions in consumption and hence wellbeing. Three types of financial protection
measures can, however, reduce this immediate impact on individuals’ consumption, or
smooth it over time (figure 1): insurance, social-protection and self-protection. In case of
insurance and social-protection, damage is covered by others, or assistance is received
to maintain consumption; examples are compensation, aid and unemployment bene-
fits. Social-protection can be formal or informal and providers include the international
community, national governments, NGOs, communities, philanthropists, relatives and
friends. If the individual is protected through insurance or social-protection, we assume
that this part of the damage is efficiently spread over a large group of people, so that
the impact on individual’s consumption is small. In this case, the EAD is an appropri-
ate estimate for the social welfare value of flood risk (Arrow and Lind, 1970; see also
figure 3). We call this collective flood risk. Note that the assumption of efficient risk
spreadingmay not be valid for all countries, such as for example small island states in the
Pacific.
For damages which are not covered through insurance or social-protection, self-
protection may reduce the immediate impact on consumption. This type of measures
are actions individuals can take to smooth the impact on consumption over time. Exam-
ples are to use savings, borrow or sell assets. Individuals with higher socioeconomic
status (i.e., income) are in general better financially protected than individuals with
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Figure 3. Risk premiummultiplier as a function of social flood vulnerability.
lower status, for example because they have larger social networks, are higher educated
and therefore better able to request compensation or aid, or have better access to credit
markets (e.g., Zakour and Gillespie, 2013; Hallegatte et al., 2016, 2017).
We define social flood vulnerability of individuals as the consumption lost in a year
after a flood (accounting for financial protection), as a fraction of annual income.1 The
higher this fraction is, the more vulnerable the individual is, and the harder it is to
recover. For an individual’s recovery, we consider two scenarios. The first scenario is
that the consumption loss is so large that consumption falls below a critical threshold
(e.g., the poverty line) and recovery is impossible. This may have serious consequences,
such as lasting poverty, personal bankruptcy (Lawless, 2005), migration, starvation (e.g.,
Naqvi and Rehm, 2014), infant mortality (Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang, 2013) or suicide
(Krug et al., 1999). In a social welfare CBA, such individual catastrophic flood risk cannot
be properly valued unless it is assumed that the individual will die – in which case the
value of statistical life (VoSL) or a ‘VoSL like parameter’ (Weitzman, 2009) can be used
as an upper bound estimate for the value of the damage.2 By using the same VoSL for
all individuals, individual catastrophic flood risk can be aggregated without using equity
weights (Somanathan, 2006).
1In developing countries especially, detailed income data is often not available, or is incomplete
(i.e., informal sector). In socioeconomic studies, instead of income, estimates of consumption are often
used (e.g., Lanjouw et al., 2013). In this paper, we assume that income and consumption are the same
and use the two interchangeably. This assumption is more valid for the poor than for the non-poor
(Hallegatte et al., 2016).
2The valuation of a life may be different than the VoSL when the probability of dying is high and it
is known who will die. However, the VoSL in figure 1 is multiplied by the flood probability, hence the
probability of dying due to a flood can be low, and we do not know how much aid is going to be given, and
to whom, and hence who is going to die from starvation.
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In the second scenario, the consumption loss is not too large, and recovery is possible.
For the valuation of individual recoverable flood risk, the expected annual consumption
loss (EACL) has to be converted first into an expected annual wellbeing loss (EAWBL).
This conversion is implemented by using the so-called risk premium, which is based
on the utility function.3 We start with an example. Suppose that there is a probability
of 1/500 per year on a consumption loss of US$500, in which case the EACL is US$1.
A person earning US$10,000 annually is not vulnerable to such loss (social flood vulner-
ability is 0.05), and would not be willing to pay significantly more than US$1 per year
to prevent it. A person earning US$700 per year is, however, highly vulnerable (social
flood vulnerability is 0.71) and would be willing to pay more, for example US$3 per
year, to prevent this loss.4 For this person, the increase in wellbeing, which is equal to
his willingness-to-pay, would be US$3 per year if the loss can be prevented. The risk pre-
mium is the difference between the willingness-to-pay and expected damage, which is
US$2 per year. This is called risk aversion, and is implemented by multiplying the EACL
by the risk premium multiplier to derive the annual wellbeing loss (or willingness-to-
pay). Figure 3 illustrates that the value of this risk premium multiplier increases more
than proportionally with social flood vulnerability (Kind et al., 2017).
The value of the risk premium multiplier depends on the flood probability, the
mathematical expression for the utility function, and the elasticity of marginal utility
of consumption (see equation (3) in section 3). It is close to 1 (no risk premium) for
low social flood vulnerability, while it reaches infinity if social flood vulnerability is 1
(in which case all consumption is lost and the event is completely catastrophic for the
individual).
Willingness-to-pay is a monetary estimate of the increase in individual wellbeing if
the flood risk is eliminated. To aggregate willingness-to-pay of individuals with different
incomes into a value for the social welfare flood risk, equity weights have to be applied
additionally (Kind et al., 2017). This ensures that the willingness-to-pay of, for example,
US$10 per year for a poor person gets a higher weight than it gets for a richer person.
Applying risk premiums and equity weights simultaneously does not lead to ‘double
counting’: whereas risk premiums correct for differences in the values of a US$ for the
same individual, but in situations with and without flooding, and hence with low and
high consumption, equity weights correct for differences in values of a US$ for different
individuals with low and high income or consumption (see also footnote 6).
Finally, total social welfare flood risk is the sum of collective, individual recoverable
and catastrophic flood risks.
The framework shows that financial protection for individuals who suffer potentially
relatively large damages compared to their baseline consumption is an important driver
in the socioeconomic flood risk assessment. Low levels of financial protection lead to
relatively high social flood vulnerability and high social welfare losses. High levels of
financial protection indicate that damages are spread over large groups and/or over long
periods of time, and lead to lower social vulnerabilities and lower social welfare losses.
We follow Hallegatte et al.’s (2016) definition for the indicator of socioeconomic flood
resiliency as expected annual damage divided by expected annual social welfare loss. If
the value is 1, damages are perfectly spread over the population and/or in time, which is
the highest achievable. A value less than 1 indicates that damages are imperfectly spread
3This risk premium is unrelated to the insurance premium.
4Using equation (3), the reader can verify that with γ = 1.2 the willingness-to-pay is US$1.03 and
US$2.97 for a person with US$10,000 and a person with US$700 respectively.
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and that social flood risk can also be reduced by providing financial protection and/or
by redistributing income.
3. Quantification
In this section, we provide the equations to quantify the social welfare flood risk. Those
are based on Kind et al. (2017), in which the theoretical background is also provided.5
Some elements in figure 1 are not quantified: those are the adaptation/transformation
process that follows recovery and which may lead to measures that change physical
and/or social flood vulnerability, and hence flood resiliency over time.
For illustrational purposes, we represent flood riskwith a single eventwith probability
P. Social welfare flood risk is the sum of collective, individual recoverable and individual
catastrophic flood risk (figure 1). To this end, the damage for individual i,Di, is split into
two parts: Di,individual, which the individual has to pay, and Di,collective, which is covered
collectively through insurance and/or social-protection.
3.1 Collective flood risk
Since we assume that Di,collective is spread over a large group and does not have a signif-
icant effect on individuals’ consumption, the expected annual collective flood damage
EADi,collective =P×Di,collective provides the social welfare value of this risk.
3.2 Individual recoverable flood risk
Individualswill protect themselves against large reductions in consumptiondue to flood-
ing, e.g., by using savings or by borrowing, through which they smooth the impact on
consumption over time. In our model, Di,individual is smoothed over time T; this leads to
consumption losses in the years after a flood according to
CLi,t = fi,t(Di,individual), (1)
whereCLi,t = consumption loss for individual i in year t; f i,t(Di,individual)= consumption




Self-protection smooths the impact on consumption and thereby lowers social flood
vulnerability, zi,t, which is defined as:
zi,t = CLi,tYi,0 , (2)
where Yi,0 = baseline annual income of individual i.
As long as zi,t does not exceed a critical threshold, the individual can recover. Expected
annual consumption loss for year t after a flood, EACLi,t, is then equal to P×CLi,t.
The risk-premium multiplier REAWBLi,t/EACLi,t converts this into an expected annual
5In this paper, we use other terminology than in Kind et al. (2017): expected annual wellbeing loss
(EAWBL) instead of certainty equivalent annual damage (CEAD), and expected annual social welfare loss
(EASWL) instead of equity weighted certainty equivalent annual damage (EWCEAD).
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wellbeing loss EAWBLi,t (Kind et al., 2017):
REAWBLi,t/EACLi,t =
1 − {1 + P((1 − zi,t)1−γ1 − 1)}1/(1−γ1)
Pzi,t
, (3)
where γ 1 = elasticity of marginal utility of income (γ 1 = 1).
The EAWBL due to EACL for year t is
EAWBLi,t = REAWBLi,t/EACLi,t × EACLi,t . (4)
Total EAWBL equals the discounted sum of EAWBL over the period over which the





(1 + d)t , (5)
where d= social discount rate.
For aggregation of individual wellbeing into social welfare, equity weights are
applied.6 The expected annual social welfare loss EASWLi for individual i equals the







where γ 2 = elasticity of marginal utility of income; and Yavg = average per capita
income.
While risk premiums (equation (3)) and equity weights (equation (6)) are based on
the same elasticity of marginal utility of income, we use two different parameters for the
elasticity: γ 1 and γ 2. Countries and donors have different CBA guidelines; some of them
allow risk premiums but prohibit equity weights, in which case γ 1 >0 and γ 2 = 0. For
an overview of CBA guidelines, see Kind et al. (2017).
3.3 Catastrophic flood risk
If zi,t exceeds a critical threshold, the individual cannot recover and the risk is
catastrophic. As discussed in section 2, the social welfare value of catastrophic risk cannot
be determined unless the VoSL is used as a proxy.
3.4 Social welfare flood risk











6The risk premium does not replace the need for equity weights. The reader can verify that if P equals 1,
or social flood vulnerability (zi,t) is low, the risk premium is (close to) zero. But also in this case, a US$
has a higher social welfare value for a poor person than for a non-poor person. Conversely, in case of a
perfectly equal income distribution (hence no need to apply equity weights), a risk premium on individual
recoverable flood risk still has to be applied.
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In a social welfare CBA, the risk reduction benefit of a project equals the reduction of
the EASWL.
4. Case study Ho Chi Minh City
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of the case study is to illustrate the practical feasibility of accounting for
social vulnerability and resilience in a social welfare CBA, by applying it to three wards of
Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), Vietnam. We discuss data, the calculation procedure, and
compare the results from the traditional and social welfare approaches. An important
limitation is that we only include damages to buildings and contents which is, given the
objective of our paper, defendable. We note that this results in an underestimate of the
total social welfare impacts. Including other types of damages is also problematic since
georeferenced data to estimate those damages is often unavailable.
HCMC is amegacitywith one of the highest flood risks in theworld, which is expected
to increase considerably (Hallegatte et al., 2013). To reduce flood risk, different plans
have recently been proposed. One of these is the MARD plan, which protects the inner
city with a ring dike. This plan has been studied in the HCMC Flood and Inundation
Management Project (Royal Haskoning DHV and Deltares, 2013), from which we use
information.
We consider present flood risk in three wards: W1, W2 and W3. These wards have
populations ranging between 14 and 21 thousand people, are diverse in location and
income, and have significant exposure and inundation water levels under the 1:100 year
flood scenario used in the case study (see figure 4 and table 1).
4.2 Monte Carlo approach
In reality, values for risk parameters necessary to determine social flood vulnerability
and flood risk per individual, as illustrated in figure 1, are not known. Therefore we
use estimated probability distributions of – and correlations between – the most criti-
cal parameters determining risk and vulnerability. This is implemented in aMonte Carlo
approach, through which we generate synthetic populations of 10,000 statistical individ-
uals per ward. On the basis of simulated vulnerabilities and risks for those individuals,
social welfare values of flood risk are assessed for the populations.
The 1:100 year inundation scenario and the landusemap (RoyalHaskoningDHVand
Deltares, 2013) are used to estimate probability distributions of floodwater depths in res-
idential areas. Depth-damage curves and maximum damage amounts for buildings and
contents were obtained from Huizinga et al. (2017), including estimates of their uncer-
tainty. To deal with regular nuisance floods, many households in HCMC have already
implemented private flood risk reduction measures, like raising doorsteps. For this rea-
son, we use a 15 cm threshold for water depth, below which no damage is assumed to
occur (Scussolini et al., 2017).
Income distributions of the wards are based on the database underlying Vietnam’s
Poverty Map (Lanjouw et al., 2013). This database contains estimates of per capita
income for 20 per cent of Vietnam’s population; the estimates are based on the 2009
census and 2010 Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS). The distribu-
tion of the size of the house per capita is based on data on floor space per capita from
the census, and is adjusted with a factor of 0.5 to correct for multilevel buildings (on the
basis of Scussolini et al. (2017)).
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Figure 4. Map of HCMC overlaid with water depths for the 1:100 year inundation scenario, and location of the
wards.
Table 1. Key statistics of the wards
Item W1 W2 W3
General
Total area (km2) 3.9 17.8 1.1
Residential area (km2) 1.9 3.5 0.9
Population (000s) 21.4 14.0 15.3
Average income (000s US$/cap/year) 1.7 1.3 1.4
1:100 year flood event
Maximumwater depth (m) 2.2 2.3 1.9
Average water depth inundated area (m) 0.9 1.0 0.6
Number of affected persons (000s) 5.1 9.7 13.4
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Table 2. Possible correlations between selected risk parameters
Parameters Expected correlation Correlation found in data
Per capita income and water
depth
Negative. Poorer household
tend to live in riskier areas
with higher water depths.
No data for HCMC.
Per capita income and
damage function house
Negative. Poorer households
tend to live in buildings of
lower quality material
which is more vulnerable
to flooding.
In all 3 wards, more than 95%
of the houses are of
concrete/brick (census);
hence no correlation.




0.85 (W1), 0.72 (W2) and 0.83
(W3) (census).





0.36 for houses and 0.24 for
contents (VHLSS).
Damage house per m2 and
damage contents per m2
Positive. 0; remarkably, in the VHLSS
no correlation is found.
There is little useful information on flood insurance and social- and self-protection,
and virtually no information on how these relate to income. The penetration rate of
flood insurance is very low (Reynaud et al., 2017) and government and donor aid is
likely to cover only a very small percentage of households’ flood damage (World Bank,
2010; SCFC, 2012). Information on self-protection is scarce. For many households, lack
of finance has been reported in the past as a reason not to repair even small flood damages
(SCFC, 2012; Chinh et al., 2016). The FINDEX database indicates that 70 per cent of the
population of Vietnam has no bank account (a higher percentage applies to the poor),
that almost 65 per cent saves some money, and that 30 per cent borrows some money
from family (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2018).
Due to lack of useful financial protection data, we assume a simple damage smoothing
function, CLi,t =Di,individual/ T, with T being the number of years over which the dam-
age is smoothed, leading to equal annual consumption losses. For the level of financial
protection, we assume three scenarios (section 4.4). For elasticities γ 1 and γ 2 we use 1.2
(see Kind et al., 2017), and for the social discount rate d (which is not very significant in
this approach) we use 4 per cent per year.
We consider correlations between risk parameters. This is important because, for
example, an individual with a high income is likely to own an expensive house and hence
is likely to suffer more financial flood damage. Without correlations, the Monte Carlo
analysis would generate too many statistical individuals with relatively high flood dam-
age and low income, and hence would overestimate social flood vulnerability and social
welfare flood risk. In table 2, we review some possible correlations.
Since in theMonte Carlo analysis it is only possible to correlate one parameter to one
other parameter, we include the correlation between per capita income and house area
per capita, which has the highest correlation coefficient (0.72–0.85), and we disregard
the correlation between income and damage per m2, because it has a lower coefficient
(0.24–0.36) and thus is less important.
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Table 3. Results of the traditional flood risk assessment
Item W1 W2 W3
Damage (US$ million) 10.9 32.8 19.1
Expected annual damage (000s US$/year) 109 328 191
4.3 Results of the traditional flood risk assessment
Table 3 shows results from the traditional flood risk assessment. Traditional flood risk
is highest in W2 and lowest in W1.
4.4 Results of the socioeconomic flood risk assessment
Because there is almost no data on financial protection, we determine the social welfare
risk while assuming three scenarios for financial protection. Those include two extreme
scenarios (1 and 2) to show the range of results, and one targeting scenario (3).
Scenario 1: complete coverage by insurance and/or social-protection
In scenario 1, damages for individuals are completely covered through insurance
and/or social-protection – an unlikely scenario. In this case, the social welfare flood
risk consists only of collective flood risk, which equals the value of traditional flood
risk (see figure 1) and has been reported in table 3. In this case, if for example a project
reduces the flood probability inW2 from 1/100 to 1/1,000 per year (a 90 per cent reduc-
tion) and we assume that the damage in a 1:100 and 1: 1,000 year flood event remains
the same, the annual flood risk reduction benefit in a social welfare CBA would be
0.9×US$328,000=US$295,000.
Scenario 2: no financial protection
Scenario 2 is the opposite of scenario 1 and also unlikely: it assumes no insurance,
social- and self-protection. In this case, the consumption loss in the year of the flood is
equal to the flood damage. How this translates into social welfare losses depends on the
social flood vulnerability and income of individuals (see figure 1).
Figure 5 maps the distribution of social flood vulnerability against per capita income
for three synthetic populations. The horizontal axes are divided by average annual per
capita income (US$1,300 for HCMC), while the vertical axes are divided by a value of
1 for social flood vulnerability, i.e., where consumption loss in a year is equal to annual
income.
The results show that, in the case of no financial protection, the 1:100 year flood is
catastrophic for large parts of the populations. It is most catastrophic in Ward 2, where
76.9 per cent (40.1 per cent+ 36.8 per cent) of the affected population has a consump-
tion loss in excess of annual income. In this case, the value of the risk premium and hence
of social welfare flood risk reaches ‘infinity’ (figure 3), and consequently the social wel-
fare benefit of flood risk reduction reaches infinity. In this case, a CBA is not a useful
instrument.
One suggestion is to use theVoSL as an estimate of themaximumvalue of the individ-
ual’s catastrophic loss. This VoSL can be roughly estimated at 120× per capita income
(Miller, 2000), i.e., for Vietnam in the order of US$150,000. Table 4 shows the social
welfare flood risk, if we assume that risk is catastrophic if social flood vulnerability is 1.
For all three wards, the value of the social welfare flood risk turns out to be about
30 times the value of traditional flood risk (table 3), and hence the indicator for
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Figure 5. Distribution of social flood vulnerability against per capita income for the three populations, assuming
no financial protection. Income data points cluster because income bins were used as input.
Table 4. Social welfare flood risk for scenario 2, using the VoSL to value catastrophic risk (in 000s US$ per
year)
Item W1 W2 W3
Collective flood risk 0 0 0
Individual recoverable flood risk 48 49 103
Catastrophic flood risk 2,856 11,165 6,365
Total social welfare flood risk 2,904 11,213 6,468
Socioeconomic flood resilience 0.04 0.03 0.03
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socioeconomic flood resilience is 0.03 to 0.04. If, in this context, a project would reduce
the flood probability inW2 from 1/100 to 1/1,000 per year while the damages remain the
same, the annual flood risk reduction benefit in a social welfare CBA is 0.9×US$11.2
million=US$10.1 million.
Using the VoSL assumes that all individuals faced with catastrophic risk will eventu-
ally die as an indirect effect of the flood. This is not very realistic, as the government and
international community are likely to intervene should such human disasters be about
to happen – i.e., they would provide social-protection.
Scenario 3: targeting social-protection
The previous two extreme scenarios illustrate the large social welfare benefit of being
financially protected, especially if the potential flood damage for an individual is large
compared to income. Social welfare values of flood risk in the extremes differ by a fac-
tor of 30, depending on no or complete financial protection. This makes estimating the
social welfare benefits of flood risk reduction in practice very challenging. The problem
is that in general, information on social- and self-protection is not available, and this
information cannot be collected easily: most ‘extreme’ events have not happened in real-
ity, making it difficult to predict how individuals and institutions would respond. Only
for countries with high rates and high coverage of flood insurance (for an overview, see
Lamond and Penning-Rowsell, 2014), and for countries where the government will com-
pensate the major share of flood damage (like in the Netherlands; see, e.g., Kind, 2014),
is the level of financial protection reasonably predictable and thus the value of social
welfare flood risk can be estimated with acceptable confidence.
In scenario 3, we assume that the government, as part of its overall DRR strategy,
wants to know howmuch funding would be required to prevent individual catastrophic
losses from a 1:100 year flood event. We assume no flood insurance and that the damage
which has to be covered by the individual, Di,individual, is smoothed over 5 years. Social-
protection is provided by the government and targeted such that all individuals are able
to maintain a minimum consumption of US$700 per year (≈365×US$1.90/day, which
is the poverty line), unless consumption is already below US$700 per year in which case
social-protection is targeted such that this lower consumption can be maintained.
Table 5 shows that for W2, with lowest per capita income and average financial
damage of US$3,400 per individual, this would require that on average 36 per cent
of the damage (US$1,200 per individual) has to be covered through social-protection
(Di,collective). This percentage is higher for individuals with below average income, and
lower for individuals with above average income. For W1 and W3, the required social-
protection rate is lower: 11 to 13 per cent (about US$200 per individual). Table 5 also
shows the value of the social welfare risk under this scenario.
Compared to the value of traditional flood risk (table 3), the social welfare flood risk is
of the same order of magnitude, and socioeconomic flood resilience is high (0.96–1.37).
Note that resiliency indicator values above unity for W1 and W3 are caused by above
average incomes for the wards in combination with equity weights.
In this scenario, if a flood risk project would reduce the flood probability inW2 from
1/100 to 1/1,000 per year (a reduction of 90 per cent) while the flood damages in the 1:100
year and 1:1,000 year events remain the same, the annual flood risk reduction benefit is
about 0.9×US$342 million=US$308,000.7
7This assumes that the risk premiummultiplier is insensitive for the flood probability, which is reasonable
for annual probabilities <0.01 (see Kind et al., 2017).
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Table 5. Socioeconomic flood risk assessment scenario 3
Item W1 W2 W3
Per affected person (000s US$):
Average damage (Di ) 2.1 3.4 1.4
Average Di,individual 1.9 2.1 1.2
Average Di,collective 0.2 1.2 0.2
Social-protection rate 11% 36% 13%
Per ward (000s US$/year):
Collective flood risk 9 121 23
Individual recoverable flood risk 71 221 134
Catastrophic flood risk 0 0 0
Total social welfare flood risk 80 342 157
Socioeconomic flood resilience 1.37 0.96 1.22
Note that the level of social-protection under scenario 3 does not represent the current
situation, in which the government of Vietnam compensates a maximum of US$300 per
household (i.e., less than US$100 per individual; see World Bank, 2010).
5. Discussion
The case study reveals the difficulties in reliably estimating the social welfare value of
flood risk, if social flood vulnerability is potentially high. We identify nine limitations to
implementing and validating the social welfare approach which integrates social vulner-
ability and resilience. First, microeconomic data on financial protection against floods
is not available in many regions, which is crucial information. Second, per capita con-
sumption is used as a basis for inequality, and it is assumed that income is equal to
consumption. For developing countries, this is a general assumption, since – due to
the informal economy – income is more difficult to measure than consumption. This
assumption is more valid for individuals with low incomes than with high incomes, who
do not consume all of their income. The approach therewith overestimates social flood
vulnerability and social welfare benefits of flood risk reduction for non-poor people.
Third, we assume that all flood damage will be repaired, at the expense of consump-
tion. In reality, households may choose not to repair damage if they have to sacrifice
too much consumption. Fourth, to determine when risk becomes catastrophic, we use
a threshold of 1 for the social flood vulnerability indicator. This is simplistic; however
it is very difficult to define a good alternative indicator and threshold value. Health
expenditures are sometimes considered to be catastrophic when they reach 40 per cent
of capacity to pay (i.e., expenditures on nonfood items) (Xu et al., 2003). Fifth, in the
absence of a reliable flood damage model for HCMC, we use global damage functions
and values to estimate flood risk, which are tailored to Asia (Huizinga et al., 2017). We
have no insight into the accuracy of those functions and values. Sixth, we use only one
parameter to correlate damage to income. Including more parameters will increase the
correlation, reduce social flood vulnerability and increase socioeconomic resilience. Sev-
enth, we only include damage to houses and their contents, while other damages (e.g.,
income loss, health impacts) may be as important, especially at lower inundation depths
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(e.g., Nabangchang et al., 2015). Including other damages will likely increase social flood
vulnerability, although it should be noted that floods can also create job opportuni-
ties, such as providing services during reconstruction, which may substitute for income
losses. Eighth, it is unclear whether informal settlers are included in the census data and
hencewhether their risks are accounted for. Andninth, there is no generally agreed-upon
expression for the utility function and value for the elasticity.
Notwithstanding these limitations to the social welfare approach, using traditional
risk estimates in CBAs is based on (implicit) assumptions which are often very unlikely,
notably that all damage is covered collectively, an assumption which may be especially
harmful to the poor. To better address vulnerability, Cutter et al. (2013) have proposed
combining traditional flood risk estimates with a social vulnerability indicator (SVI),
which is based on socioeconomic characteristics of the population – such as age, edu-
cation, health and income. This does not really solve the problem of estimating the
social welfare values of flood damage for different individuals or groups, because there
is no objective method to derive multipliers from the SVI which can be used to correct
traditional values of flood risks.
Our analysis highlights the importance of flood insurance and social-protection in sit-
uations where individuals’ social flood vulnerability is high, which is the case for many
people in large parts of theworld (e.g., Hallegatte et al., 2017). At present, only about one-
third of global flood damage is insured (Kind et al., 2017), and this fraction is lower for
developing countries (Munich Re, 2018).8 Especially in developing countries, many gov-
ernments already face financing gaps for a 1:100 year event, and international demands
for disaster finance exceed availability (UNISDR, 2015). Insurance, on the other hand, is
not available everywhere due to a lack of demand as well as affordability issues. There is
already, at the present time, a serious financing challenge for disaster risk, which shows
the importance of policies which aim at preventing future increases in flood risk.
6. Conclusions
In socioeconomic flood risk assessments and social welfare CBAs, flood risk reduc-
tion benefits should be based on risks for individuals. Three types of risks result from
flood damage to individuals: collective, recoverable and catastrophic flood risks. When
individuals are financially protected through insurance of social-protection, individual
damage is covered collectively. To value collective flood risk in social welfare terms, the
traditional approach – which values risk as expected annual damage – is appropriate.
The other types of risks – recoverable and catastrophic – apply to damage which is not
covered collectively. Values of these risks depend on individual social flood vulnera-
bility, which is the individual’s annual consumption loss after a flood, as a fraction of
annual baseline income. Individuals with the opportunity to smooth the impact of floods
on their consumption over several years after the flood through self-protection (e.g.,
through savings or borrowing), and individuals with higher incomes, are less socially
vulnerable to floods. If the social flood vulnerability indicator exceeds a critical thresh-
old, recovery for an individual is not possible; this is individual catastrophic flood risk.
Determining social welfare values of catastrophic risks is problematic; in theory, it is
infinitely high, and so would be the benefit of reducing it by even a tiny little bit. A
practical solution is to use the VoSL to approximate its upper bound value. Recoverable
8This is based on losses for all natural catastrophes. For Africa, South America and Asia, insured losses
are, respectively, 15, 13 and 9 per cent of total losses (Munich Re, 2018: 53).
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risk applies if the social flood vulnerability indicator does not exceed the critical thresh-
old. Individual recoverable risks have to be valued taking social flood vulnerabilities
and income differences into account, by applying risk premium multipliers and equity
weights simultaneously.
Traditional flood risk assessments and CBAs usually treat all flood risks as collective,
without justification. This may seriously underestimate the social welfare value of flood
risk; the study for HCMC suggests that this may be as high as a factor of 30. Results
of traditional flood risk assessments and CBAs that do not reflect financial protection
and social flood vulnerability of intended beneficiaries should therefore be treated with
caution. These CBAs cannot be used to guide flood risk investment decisions that are
supposed to increase social welfare, since they will be biased against measures that pro-
tect the poor – who are likely to be the least financially protected and most vulnerable,
and hence whose risk is most severely undervalued.
The HCMC study shows the difficulties in valuing recoverable and catastrophic flood
risk, especially since data on the distribution of damage over individuals with different
incomes, anddata on financial protection, ismostlymissing. Combining other social vul-
nerability indicators (e.g., those ofCutter et al., 2013)with traditional flood risk estimates
may be preferable to the traditional approach, but does not solve the valuation problem
either, especially as they are unable to identify and value catastrophic risk. Therefore, we
advise investigating – when preparing any FRM policy or plan – how (extreme) risks are
(likely to be) distributed over the population and what options there are to provide suffi-
cient financial protection for themost vulnerable. Physical flood risk reductionmeasures
can then be identified and assessed on the basis of remaining social welfare risk.
Note that social welfare approaches to flood risk assessments andCBAs do not reduce
the need to implement physical flood risk reduction measures in general. Such mea-
sures will especially increase benefits for poor and vulnerable populations, and hence
increase investments targeting them, if they are financially insufficiently protected.With
full financial protection, values of social welfare risks will coincide with the value of tra-
ditional risks. Hence, financial protection measures will not reduce the value of social
welfare risks below values of traditional risks and therefore will not lead to less physical
flood risk reduction measures compared to the traditional approach.
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